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Insider Trading and Family Firms 
 
Abstract: We find that CEOs of S&P 1500 family firms, founding CEOs in particular, 
are more active stock traders than are the CEOs of non-family firms.  Importantly, the 
stock trades made by founding CEOs (and, to a lesser extent, those made by founders’ 
descendants) are more profitable than those made by the CEOs of non-family firms.  This 
finding is more pronounced for family firms that are difficult to value or that have poor 
corporate governance.  Founding CEOs’ excess stock trading returns arise both from 
trades made before earnings surprises and those made outside earnings announcement 
periods.  Finally, founding CEOs’ trades forecast their company’s future stock returns 
better than those made by the CEOs of non-family firms.  
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I. Introduction 
Family ownership is considered to be the most prevalent form of corporate 
governance in the world (e.g., Claessens et al., 2000; Morck et al., 2005).  Prior research 
suggests that family control mitigates the classic agency problem that arises from the 
separation of ownership and management, either through the direct appointment of a 
family member as CEO or through more effective monitoring of appointed executives 
relative to non-family firms (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Anderson and Reeb, 2003a).  
However, substantial ownership may enable family members to obtain personal benefits 
at the expense of minority shareholders.  For example, family members can engage in 
related-party transactions (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a), issue special dividends 
(DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2000), freeze out small shareholders (Gilson and Gordon, 
2003), or entrench a family-appointed CEO (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Perez-Gonzalez, 
2006).  In addition to these avenues, controlling shareholders may accrue personal 
benefits by earnings excess returns on trading their own stocks - a possibility that has not 
been investigated in the prior literature.  We fill in this void by examining the differences 
in insider trading behavior between the family-controlled businesses and widely-held 
companies listed in the S&P 1500 index.  
Controlling families of family-own businesses are different from other investors.  
They typically invest a large portion of their personal wealth in the company, and they 
often hold their shares for a very long time.  For example, Anderson and Reeb (2003b) 
indicate that, on average, the founding family members in S&P 500 firms have held their 
shares for more than 78 years and have invested 69 percent of their personal wealth in the 
companies they own.  These lengthy investment horizons and undiversified portfolios 
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distinguish founding family members from both small atomistic shareholders and large 
unaffiliated blockholders such as institutional investors (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a).  
These characteristics give founding family members unique incentives and means to 
acquire more intimate knowledge of the company compared with typical managers and 
outside investors.  The central position of controlling family members within the firm 
also equips them with greater flexibility to exploit private information.  Thus, compared 
to other investors, founding family members are better able to reap excess gains from 
their stock trades. Our results are generally consistent with the notion that family 
members use their position for their own benefits at the expense of uninformed external 
shareholders. 
First, we find that the CEOs of family firms are more active stock traders than are 
the CEOs of non-family firms.  Specifically, the trades made by CEOs of family firms are 
larger and more frequent than those made by CEOs of non-family firms, a finding that is 
primarily driven by founding and descendant CEOs.  The professional CEOs of family 
firms (hired CEOs who are not affiliated with the founding family), in contrast, do not 
trade any more actively than their counterparts in non-family firms.  Importantly, stock 
trades made by the CEOs of family firms are more profitable than those made by the 
CEOs of non-family firms.  Founding CEOs generate greater profits than the CEOs of 
non-family firms when they buy or sell stocks, whereas descendant CEOs in family firms 
earn greater profits only when they sell.  In contrast, the profitability of the trades made 
by the hired CEOs of family firms is less than that of the trades made by their 
counterparts in non-family firms when those trades involve selling stocks.  Our main 
results are robust to the use of different empirical strategies and to the inclusion of 
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different control variables.  In particular, our conclusions hold both when we control for 
CEO ownership and when we compare family firms with non-family firms in which 
dedicated institutional investors have a high level of ownership.  These additional results 
suggest that our findings do not merely reflect the effect of concentrated ownership, but 
rather demonstrate that family businesses are different from other types of firms. 
Second, we find that certain firm characteristics affect family members’ insider 
trading behavior.  For example, larger abnormal returns for founding CEOs exist only in 
family firms that are difficult to value.  Specifically, excess insider trading returns occur 
only in family firms with a low accrual quality, a low degree of market transparency 
(Anderson et al., 2009) or a high degree of price volatility.  We also find that strong 
corporate governance mitigates the propensity of family CEOs to extract profits from 
their trades – that is, larger abnormal returns experienced by family CEOs occur only in 
firms with a low degree of institutional ownership or a poor governance score (i.e., the G-
index, as in Gompers et al., 2003) and in those that do not institute “blackout” periods.1  
Moreover, the likelihood of the firm having a “blackout” policy is lesser when a founding 
CEO is managing a family firm than when a hired CEO is managing a non-family firm.  
This likelihood is greater, in contrast, for family firms managed by hired CEOs than it is 
for non-family firms managed by these CEOs. This suggests that family CEOs choose 
their optimal level of governance which allows them greater flexibility in trading their 
own stocks. 
Lastly, we investigate the nature of the advantage enjoyed by the CEOs of family 
firms.  We find that founding CEOs who trade before earnings surprises earn a higher 
                                                 
1 Many firms restrict insiders to trading during the period following quarterly earnings announcements.  
Such a restriction has been shown to be successful in preventing insiders from making trades based on 
private information that is related to earnings news (e.g., Bettis et al., 2000). 
 5
level of abnormal returns than do the CEOs of non-family firms when they trade during 
similar periods.  There is no discernable pattern for the descendant or hired CEOs of 
family firms.  Founding CEOs (and, to a lesser extent, descendant CEOs), in contrast, 
earn a higher level of abnormal returns than the CEOs of non-family firms when they 
trade outside pre-announcement periods, whereas the hired CEOs of family firms earn a 
lower level of abnormal returns than their counterparts in non-family firms.  Further, the 
trades made by founding CEOs (and, to a lesser extent, those made by descendant CEOs) 
are more related to the company’s future stock returns than are those made by the CEOs 
of non-family firms.  In aggregate, our results suggest that the larger insider trading 
returns enjoyed by family CEOs can be explained by both superior private information 
and weaker corporate governance.  
This study makes at least three contributions.  First, we complement the existing 
literature on family businesses.  Although prior studies have argued that the strong legal 
protection in the U.S. reduces the capacity of controlling shareholders to expropriate 
minority shareholders (e.g., Burkart et al., 2003), our findings indicate that founding 
families are able to accrue personal benefits by exploiting inside information.  This result 
is perhaps surprising.  Given that the personal assets of controlling family members are 
closely related to their firms, they could be expected to be more sensitive to the increased 
cost of capital and the reputational and legal risks associated with insider trading.  
However, our results show that this is not the case, and thus our study identifies a cost 
borne by the presence of founding family ownership.  Second, we identify two potential 
channels, one information-based and one governance-based, through which family CEOs 
can earn greater insider trading profits than typical managers.  Although we find support 
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for both channels, the evidence is more robust for the corporate governance-based one.  
More specifically, our results suggest that family firms choose their optimal level of 
governance (from the point of view of the family members) and allow themselves greater 
flexibility in trading their own stocks. 2   When they serve as monitors, in contrast, 
founding family members place hired CEOs under greater scrutiny, which leads to 
reduced insider trading profitability.  Finally, our study contributes to the extant literature 
on insider trading.  Insider trading has attracted a significant amount of attention from 
policy makers, researchers, and investors because of its potentially destabilizing effect on 
financial markets (e.g., Wei and Milkiewicz, 2003; Chakraborty and Yilmaz, 2004).  
Aside from a few notable exceptions (e.g., Givoly and Palmon, 1985; Aboody and Lev, 
2000), however, previous studies have not thoroughly examined the variations in insider 
trading patterns across firms.  We provide evidence of the way in which different types of 
CEOs and ownership structures affect insider trading behavior.  To the best of our 
knowledge, this issue has not previously been investigated.3  The results reported here 
suggest that it is essential that future studies consider ownership structure and CEO type 
when evaluating insider trading profitability.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II develops our empirical 
hypotheses, Section III describes the sample, and Section IV discusses the empirical 
results.  Section V concludes the paper. 
 
                                                 
2 However, this does not necessarily imply that there is an overall negative effect on shareholder welfare.  
For example, insider trading may be an alternative form of managerial compensation that is perhaps more 
efficient than direct monetary compensation from the firm.  Insider trading may also be an efficient way of 
impounding information into price. 
3  Fidrmuc et al. (2006) investigate how director ownership and outside shareholders affect the stock 
market’s reaction to the reporting of insider trading in the U.K.  Their study does not specifically consider 
family ownership, and they argue that insider trading regulations in the U.K. differ substantially from those 
in the U.S.  Thus, their conclusions may not be generalizable to the U.S. 
 7
II. Hypothesis Development 
Family firms and the profitability of insider trading 
The prior literature (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Villalonga and Amit, 2006) 
suggests that one of the benefits of family ownership is the mitigation of the classic 
agency problem that arises from the separation of ownership and management.  By 
construction, there is little divergence of interest between management and shareholders 
in family firms in which family members hold the CEO post.  Even when family firms 
are operated by hired professional managers who are unaffiliated with the controlling 
family, the classical agency problem should be reduced because family members who 
hold a large and undiversified ownership stake have a strong incentive to scrutinize these 
managers.  Consistent with this view, the prior literature suggests that family firms realize 
better operating performance (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003a) and enjoy a lower cost of 
debt than non-family firms (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003). 
However, their substantial share holdings also allow controlling family members 
to expropriate firm resources at the expense of minority shareholders, which may lead to 
more severe conflicts between controlling and non-controlling shareholders.  For example, 
the prior literature suggests that family members can extract rents by freezing out small 
shareholders (e.g., Gilson and Gordon, 2003), issuing special dividends (e.g., DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo, 2000; Faccio et al., 2001), or holding the CEO position without delivering 
good performance (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Perez-Gonzalez, 2006).   
We posit that there may be an additional channel by which controlling 
shareholders expropriate minority shareholders that has not been considered in the prior 
literature.  Previous studies suggest that information asymmetry enables insiders to gain 
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excess returns from stock trading (e.g., Seyhun, 1986, 1998; Aboody and Lev, 2000).  
Thus, one channel by which family members can expropriate minority shareholders is the 
exploitation of private information to make profitable trades in the company’s stock.  
Family members often maintain active involvement with the company and hold their 
stocks for extended periods of time (Anderson and Reeb, 2003b).  This lengthy 
involvement may give them two advantages over the CEOs of non-family firms.  On the 
one hand, family members may have a thorough understanding of the company’s 
operations and superior industry knowledge.  This may allow family members to possess 
better inside information relative to typical managers and outside investors (e.g., Kwak, 
2003; Anderson and Reeb, 2003a).  On the other hand, family members may also have 
greater facility to circumvent the internal checks-and-balances that may have prevented 
them from trading on superior information in non-family firms.  In both cases, we predict 
that the stock trades made by the CEOs of family firms are more profitable than those 
made by their counterparts in non-family firms. 
 
H1a: The stock transactions made by the CEOs of family firms generate larger 
abnormal returns than those made by the CEOs of non-family firms. 
 
Although we expect the trades made by the CEOs of family firms to earn 
abnormal returns on average, we expect the profitability of these trades to vary by CEO 
type.  More specifically, we expect that the founding CEOs of family firms enjoy greater 
advantages than those hired from outside the family.  For example, previous studies (e.g., 
Morck et al., 1988; Fahlenbrach, 2007) suggest that founding CEOs tend to have strong 
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managerial abilities and possess rich business knowledge relative to typical managers.  
Such CEOs also have the most intimate knowledge of the firm, as they have been closely 
involved with its daily operating activities since it was founded.  In addition, Anderson et 
al. (2009) note (p. 206) that founders “can gain additional influence through 
disproportionate board control, management postings, dual-class share structures, and 
their long-term affiliation with the firm (Zingales, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Anderson and Reeb, 2004).”  Thus, founding CEOs are better able to transform their 
knowledge into profitable trades.  This reasoning motivates our next hypothesis, as 
follows. 
 
H1b: The founding CEOs of family firms earn larger abnormal returns than the 
CEOs of non-family firms when they trade in their own company stock. 
 
In contrast, we expect the hired CEOs of family firms to be less likely to profit 
from their stock trades than family managers or even than the hired CEOs of non-family 
firms.  For example, the prior literature suggests that insider trading has a negative effect 
on liquidity and the cost of capital (e.g., Bettis et al., 2000; Jeng et al., 1998).  Given that 
a very large portion of family members’ personal wealth is tied to their company, we 
expect them to monitor hired managers more closely than do the small or dispersed 
investors in non-family firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003b) or more generally than 
investors who have fewer incentives to monitor managers.  If this reasoning is correct, 
then we expect the hired executives in family firms to have less capacity to exploit their 
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inside information than the founding CEOs of family firms or the hired CEOs of non-
family firms: 
 
H1c: Hired CEOs in family firms earn a lower level of abnormal returns than 
their counterparts in non-family firms when they trade in the stock of their own 
companies.  
 
We expect descendant CEOs to be in an intermediate position between the 
founding and hired CEOs of family firms.  Descendant CEOs often start learning about 
the family business at a young age and gain hands-on experience from the founder 
(BusinessWeek, 2003; Kwak, 2003).  Thus, these CEOs may also have a better 
understanding of their company than hired CEOs, although their level of skills and 
company knowledge is likely to be lower than that of founding CEOs.  They are also 
likely to have greater influence on corporate decisions than CEOs hired from outside the 
family, but probably less influence than founding CEOs.  This ambiguity precludes us 
from forming strong ex ante expectations regarding the amount of abnormal profits 
earned by descendant CEOs, although we expect it to fall between that earned by 
founding CEOs and the hired CEOs of family firms. 
 
Information-based explanation  
We have motivated our first hypothesis that the CEOs of family firms, their 
founders in particular, earn more abnormal returns than the CEOs of non-family firms 
when they trade in their own company’s stock by hypothesizing that family-member 
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CEOs either have greater business knowledge or greater capacity to exercise that 
knowledge (because they have greater control over firm governance).  We now consider 
the merits of these two, not mutually exclusive, explanations.  To do so, we examine 
whether differences in firm characteristics affect the capacity of these CEOs to generate 
abnormal profits.   
Our first, information-based, explanation suggests that the greater profitability of 
the trades made by founding CEOs can be explained by their greater knowledge relative 
to the CEOs of non-family firms.  If this explanation is correct, then we would expect that 
the advantage enjoyed by founding CEOs to be greater when their firms are difficult to 
value.  For example, Huddart and Ke (2007) suggest that uncertainty over firm value is a 
prerequisite for information asymmetry, in which case this asymmetry creates 
opportunities for insiders to trade on private information.  The information advantage 
enjoyed by a founding CEO should be mitigated by a transparent information 
environment.  Consistent with this notion, Anderson et al. (2009) find that opaque family 
firms have a low Tobin’s Q, whereas transparent family firms do not.  This suggests that 
opacity enables controlling shareholders to extract firm resources for their personal 
benefit.  Thus, we expect that the larger abnormal profits from stock trading earned by the 
founding CEOs of family firms, if any, occur primarily in firms with an opaque 
environment. 
 
H2: The founding CEOs of family firms earn larger abnormal returns from their 
stock transactions than the CEOs of non-family firms only when the company is 
opaque. 
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Governance-based explanation 
Our second, governance-based, explanation suggests that the greater profitability 
of the trades made by founding CEOs stems from their greater capacity relative to the 
CEOs of non-family firms to circumvent internal corporate governance mechanisms.  If 
this explanation is correct, then we would expect the advantage of founding CEOs to be 
less in firms in which alternative governance mechanisms can reduce their influence.  We 
focus on two specific governance mechanisms that may restrict family CEOs from 
reaping excess insider trading gains: the presence of (1) institutional ownership and (2) 
“blackout” periods.   
Chung et al. (2009) argue that good governance improves financial and 
operational transparency and thus reduces the information asymmetry between insiders 
and outside investors that is conducive to insider trading profits.  Chung and Zhang (2009) 
show that the fraction of a company’s shares that is held by institutional investors 
increases with the quality of its governance structure.  Putting these arguments together, 
we expect that the large abnormal profits from stock trading enjoyed by founding CEOs, 
if any, occur primarily in firms with a low percentage of institutional ownership.   
 
H3a: The founding CEOs of family firms earn larger abnormal returns from their 
stock transactions than the CEOs of non-family firms only when the company’s 
level of institutional ownership is low. 
 
Many companies in the U.S. regulate insider trading by instituting their own 
policies (e.g., Bettis et al., 2000; Jeng, 1998).  These policies explicitly specify certain 
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periods during which insiders can trade their stocks and certain “blackout” periods during 
which they cannot.  Such policies typically indicate that insiders are not allowed to trade 
immediately before quarterly earnings announcements and are only allowed to trade for 
around 12 days after earnings announcements.  These restrictions appear to be successful 
at preventing insiders from trading based on earnings news-related private information.  
For example, Bettis et al. (2000) indicate (p.191) that “‘blackout’ periods successfully 
suppress trading, both purchases and sales, by insiders”. Jeng (1998) finds that a portfolio 
of insider purchases from firms that do not regulate the timing of trades made by insiders 
earns abnormal returns, whereas such purchases at firms that do regulate the timing do 
not.  This finding should also hold true for founding CEOs, which brings us to our final 
hypothesis, as follows. 
 
H3b: The founding CEOs of family firms earn larger abnormal returns from their 
stock transactions than do the CEOs of non-family firms only when the company 
has not instituted a “blackout” policy. 
 
III. SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Our sample consists of all firms listed in the S&P 1500 index in 2002, and the 
sample period spans from 1997 to 2006.  We follow Anderson and Reeb (2003a) in 
classifying corporations as family and non-family firms.  For the companies in the S&P 
500 index, we directly use the classification by BusinessWeek (2003), that is, a company 
is a family firm if the founder, or his or her descendants, holds the position of CEO, top 
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executive, or director of the board or is the largest shareholder.4  Based on this definition, 
177 firms (35.4%) in the S&P 500 index as family firms and the remaining 323 as non-
family firms.  We manually classify firms in the S&P 400 midcap and S&P 600 small cap 
indices using a two-step process.  First, we collect information about a company’s history 
and its founder from various sources, including corporate proxy statements, company 
websites, Hoover’s Inc., Gale Business Resources, and an Internet search.  Second, after 
identifying the founding family for each company, we read through SEC documents to 
see whether the founding family members still maintain a presence in the company.  The 
results indicate that 508 firms (50.8%) in the S&P 400 midcap and S&P 600 small cap 
indices are still controlled by their founding families.  Overall, we classify 685 (45.67%) 
of the firms in the S&P 1500 as family firms.  The percentage of family firms in this 
index is similar to that reported by Chen, Chen, and Cheng (2008) and Anderson et al. 
(2009).  We obtain insider trading data from Thomson Reuters, accounting data from 
Compustat, and price data from CRSP. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics.  In Panel A, we consider family and non-
family firms separately.  We first consider the characteristics of the trades made by 
insiders (Trade).  As in Aboody and Lev (2000), we focus on the open market purchases 
and sales carried out by CEOs, as these transactions are more likely to be information-
based.5  We find that the number of transactions carried out per year by insiders (Freq) is 
nearly 50 percent larger in family firms than in non-family firms.  The size of these 
                                                 
4 This definition of family firms has been used in various academic studies, including those carried out by 
Anderson and Reeb (2003b, 2004), Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003), Villalonga and Amit (2006), Wang 
(2006), Ali et al. (2007), Anderson et al. (2009), Chen, Chen, and Cheng (2008), Chen, Cheng, and Dai 
(2008), and Chen et al. (2009).  
5 As indicated in Aboody and Lev (2000), open market stock purchases and sales tend to be driven by 
inside information, whereas other insider trading activities (e.g., the acquisition of stocks through incentive 
plans or option exercises) may be motivated by other purposes (e.g., liquidity needs). 
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transactions is also larger in family firms than in non-family firms.  This finding holds 
true irrespective of whether we use the average monetary value (MeanValue) per 
transaction during each calendar year, the average raw number of shares (MeanShares) or 
the total shares traded per year as a percentage of total shares owned by CEO at the 
beginning of the year (MeanShares%).  The differences in trading activity are all 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  These results also hold regardless of whether we 
use the mean or the median values of the variables.  We next look at the cumulative 
abnormal returns from the transaction date to one day before the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) transaction filing date (CAR) for sales and purchases.  We 
employ the traditional market model to compute abnormal stock returns.  We find that 
abnormal returns are higher in family firms than in non-family firms, although the 
differences are not statistically significant.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, we also find that the 
percentage of CEO ownership (CEO Ownership) is four to five times larger in family 
firms than in non-family firms.  Lastly, our results indicate that family firms have a lower 
market capitalization (SIZE), higher market-to-book ratio (MB), and higher return on 
assets (ROA) than non-family firms.6  We control for these different variables in the 
models estimated below. 
In Panel B, we partition the sample based on whether the family CEO is the 
founder, a descendant of the founder, or has been hired from outside the family.  Results 
indicate that founding CEOs trade more often and in larger quantities than do the CEOs 
of non-family firms.  This effect is statistically significant.  The descendant and hired 
                                                 
6  SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value (in millions of U.S. dollars) of common equity 
(Compustat Data#25*Data#199) at the end of the fiscal year.  MB is the ratio of the market value of 
common equity (Compustat Data#25*Data#199) to the book value of common equity (Compustat Data#60) 
at the end of the fiscal year.  ROA is the accounting return (Compustat #Data18) on total assets 
(Compustat#Data6). 
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CEOs of family firms also have higher mean and median trading activity values than do 
the CEOs of non-family firms, although the difference is largely statistically insignificant 
(in particular for hired CEOs).  In addition, the values for mean and median abnormal 
returns are higher for the founding CEOs of family firms than for the CEOs of non-family 
firms.  In contrast, these values are lower for the hired CEOs of family firms than for 
their counterparts in non-family firms.  These differences are statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  The profitability of the trades made by descendant CEOs is similar 
to that of those made by the CEOs of non-family firms.  Finally, the level of CEO 
ownership is higher for all types of family firm CEOs (compared to non-family firm 
CEOs).   
 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Family firms, frequency and size of insider trades 
Before testing our first hypothesis, we explore the trading pattern of insiders in 
family firms.  To this end, we estimate two related models.  In the first model, we regress 
different characteristics of trading activity on family firm status and different control 
variables: 
 
Trade = α+ β1 FAMILYFIRM + β2 SIZE + β3 MB + β4 ROA + βK IndusK + βJ YearJ + ε, 
                                                                                                                                         (1a) 
where Trade represents different characteristics of the stock trades made by insiders 
(Freq, MeanValue and MeanShares%), as defined in Section III.7  FAMILYFIRM is an 
indicator variable that is equal to one if the company is a family firm, and zero otherwise.  
                                                 
7 We obtain similar results with MeanShares (untabulated). 
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We also include three previously defined firm characteristics (SIZE, MB and ROA).  
IndusK (YearJ) are K (J) indicator variables that take the value of one if a firm belongs to 
the Kth two-digit SIC code (to the Jth calendar year), and zero otherwise.  The t-statistics 
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and for the simultaneous clustering of observations by 
firm and calendar year (Cameron et al., 2009).  We also estimate a second related model: 
 
Trade = α+ β1 FOUNDER + β2 DESCENDANT + β3 HIRED + β4 SIZE + β5 MB  
   + β6ROA + βK IndusK + βJ YearJ + ε,                                                                  (1b) 
 
where FOUNDER is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the company is a family 
firm and the CEO is the founder of that firm, and zero otherwise.  DESCENDANT is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the company is a family firm and the CEO is a 
descendant of the firm founder, and zero otherwise.8  HIRED is an indicator variable that 
is equal to one if the company is a family firm and the CEO has been hired from outside 
the family, and zero otherwise.  The other variables are as previously defined. 
We report the results for model (1a) in Panel A of Table 2.  They indicate that the 
CEOs of family firms engage in more frequent and larger transactions than their 
counterparts in non-family firms, and the effect is economically significant.  For example, 
setting FAMILYFIRM to one increases MeanShares% by close to 50% of its average 
value.9  The effect is also statistically significant, with the t-statistics ranging from 3.49 to 
7.97.  The CEOs of firms with large market capitalization, a high market-to-book ratio, 
and high ROA also tend to engage in more frequent and larger transactions.  We report 
                                                 
8 We treat sons- and daughters-in-law as descendants. 
9 The average values of Freq, MeanValue, and MeanShares% of the entire sample are 8.9, 1.72 and 3.49%, 
respectively. 
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the results for model (1b) in Panel B of Table 2.  They indicate that founding CEOs 
engage in more frequent and larger transactions than do the CEOs of non-family firms, 
and the effect is economically significant.  For example, setting FOUNDER to one 
increases the value of MeanShares% by 75% of its mean value.  This effect is also 
statistically significant, with the t-statistics ranging from 3.58 to 11.74 for founding CEOs.  
We find a similar effect for descendant CEOs, although both its economic and statistical 
significance are less, with the t-statistics ranging from 1.82 to 2.73.  In contrast, we 
observe no significant differences between the hired CEOs of family and non-family 
firms in terms of trading frequency or size.  The results reported in Table 2 are not 
materially affected if we control for CEO age, tenure, and ownership in the estimation of 
equations (1a) and (1b). 10   Overall, these results are consistent with the univariate 
statistics reported in Table 1. 
 
Family firms and the profitability of insider trading 
We next examine whether family firms generate larger abnormal returns from 
trading their own stocks.  We form monthly calendar-time portfolios (i.e., Mitchell and 
Stafford, 2000; Fama, 1998) based on CEO type and the CEO’s stock transactions, as 
follows.  First, for each stock purchase made by insiders in family firms, we calculate raw 
returns from the transaction date to one day before the SEC filing date (as in Aboody and 
Lev, 2000).  A company is considered to be a “net purchaser” (“net seller”) if its CEO 
purchased more (fewer) stocks than he or she sold.  Then, we compute the firm-specific 
transaction-to-filing date return as the average of all of the insider transactions that 
                                                 
10 We only control for ownership when Freq or MeanValue is the dependent variable. 
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occurred in the given month.11  Next, we calculate equally weighted returns over all firms 
in the portfolio.  We carry out a similar procedure for the purchases made by insiders in 
non-family firms, and form a hedge portfolio that goes long in the portfolios of family 
firms and short in those of non family firms.  We then regress the monthly hedge 
portfolio returns on Carhart’s (1997) four factors: 
 
Hedgept = αp+ β1p(Rmt – Rft) + β2p SMBt + β3p HMLt + β4p MOMt + ε.                            (2) 
 
The dependent variable is the hedge portfolio monthly return (Hedge).  RMt is the return 
on the value-weighted market index at time t.  RFt is the three-month Treasury bill yield 
at time t.  SMBt is the return on small firms minus that on large firms at time t.  HMLt is 
the return on high book-to-market stocks minus that on low book-to-market stocks at time 
t.  MOMt is the momentum factor in Carhart (1997).  We obtain the data for the different 
factors from Ken French’s website.12  Our conclusions are unaffected (untabulated results) 
by controlling for the aggregate liquidity risk (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003).  We correct 
the standard errors for heteroskedasticity and for serial correlation using the Newey-West 
(1987) procedure.  The intercept, α, measures the abnormal returns associated with the 
insider trades in family firms relative to those obtained by insiders in non-family firms.  
We then repeat the procedure by constructing the following three hedge portfolios for 
each calendar month in our sample period.  In the first hedge portfolio, we go long in a 
portfolio of family firms for which the CEO is a net stock purchaser in a given month and 
is the founding CEO.  In the second, we go long in a portfolio of family firms for which 
                                                 
11 If the transaction-to-filing period is spread over two calendar months, we split the returns between the 
two months accordingly. 
12 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/ 
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the CEO is a net stock purchaser in a given month and is a descendant of the founder 
CEO.  Finally, in the third, we go long in a portfolio of family firms for which the CEO is 
a net stock purchaser in a given month and is a hired CEO of a family firm.  In all cases, 
we go short in a portfolio of non-family firms for which the CEO is a net stock purchaser 
in a given month.  We then also form four similar hedge portfolios based on the returns of 
firms in which the CEO is a net stock seller in a given month.  The results of this 
portfolio analysis are reported in Panel A of Table 3.   
With regard to insider purchases, the results in column (1) of Panel A indicate that 
the CEOs of family firms generate larger gains from their stock purchases than do their 
counterparts in non-family firms.  The intercept (α) is significantly positive, both 
economically (2.4 percent per month) and statistically (the t-statistic equals 2.38).  These 
results are consistent with hypothesis H1a.  Columns (2) to (4) of Panel A present the 
results for the subsamples of family firms.  Consistent with hypothesis H1b, these results 
suggest that the larger gains from stock purchases in family firms are driven by founding 
CEOs.  The estimated intercept is significantly positive (3.1%, the t-statistic equals 2.29) 
in column (2), whereas it is insignificant in columns (3) and (4) in which we report the 
results for descendant and hired CEOs. 
The results for CEOs’ stock sales are also consistent with hypotheses H1a, H1b, 
and H1c.  The intercept in column (1) is significantly negative (-1.2% with a t-statistic of 
-1.84), which suggests that the stock sales undertaken by the CEOs of family firms are 
associated with more negative returns than those made by the CEOs of non-family firms.  
Again, the results for the sub-samples of family firms are presented in columns (2) to (4).  
The estimated intercept is significantly negative in column (2) for founding CEOs (-1.5% 
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with a t-statistic of -2.16) and in column (3) for descendant CEOs (1.5% with a t-statistic 
of -2.22).  In contrast, the intercept is significantly positive (1.2% with a t-statistic of 2.24) 
in column (4), which suggests that the stock sales undertaken by the hired CEOs of 
family firms are less profitable than those undertaken by their counterparts in non-family 
firms.  This result suggests that these trades are less likely to be motivated by inside 
information and more likely to be motivated by the need for liquidity or portfolio 
rebalancing than those made by founding CEOs or even by the CEOs of non-family firms. 
In Panel B of Table 3, we reproduce the results from Panel A, but further partition 
the sample between family firms with high and low degrees of family ownership.  We 
recalculate the monthly returns of our different hedge portfolios for both categories and 
re-estimate the portfolio regressions.  To conserve space, we tabulate only the estimated 
intercepts and their corresponding t-statistics, but include our different control variables 
in the specifications.  A firm is defined as having a high degree of family ownership if the 
ownership stake held by the founding family is above the sample median.  The remaining 
family firms are considered to have a low degree of family ownership.  We report the 
results in Panel B of Table 3.  They are consistent with those reported in Panel A.  For 
family firms with a high degree of family ownership, the intercept is significant in the 
sample of the CEOs of family firms and that of founding CEOs who are net purchasers.  
The intercepts are significantly positive in all four samples of net sellers (positive for the 
CEOs of family firms, positive for founding and descendant CEOs, and negative for 
CEOs hired from outside the family).  In contrast, they are all statistically insignificant 
for family firms with a low degree of family ownership.  The only exception is the 
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portfolio of insider purchases made by founding CEOs.  In this case, the intercept is 
marginally significant (the t-statistic equals 1.83) in the low family ownership sample.   
Before moving to the test of our next hypothesis, we perform several robustness 
tests to confirm the results presented in Table 3.  First, we reproduce our analysis but, 
instead of using a portfolio approach, we use ordinary least square regressions in which 
we treat each stock trade as an observation.  More specifically, we estimate the following 
models. 
 
CAR = α+ β1 FAMILYFIRM + β2 SIZE + β3 MB + β4 ROA + βK IndusK + βJ YearJ + ε,     
                 (3a) 
                                                                                                                                
CAR = α+ β1 FOUNDER + β2 DESCENDANT + β3 HIRED + β4 SIZE + β5 MB  
 + β6ROA + βK IndusK + βJ YearJ + ε,                                                                    (3b) 
 
where CAR, FAMILYFIRM, FOUNDER, DESCENDANT, HIRED, SIZE, MB, ROA 
IndusK, and YearJ are previously defined variables.  The t-statistics are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and for the simultaneous clustering of observations by firm and 
calendar month (e.g., Cameron et al., 2009).  We estimate the model in the samples of net 
buyers and net sellers, and the results (untabulated) are consistent with those reported in 
Table 3.  In the net buyer sample, FAMILYFIRM and FOUNDER are positive with t-
statistics of 1.81 and 2.42, HIRED is negative with a t-statistic equal to -1.93, and 
DESCENDANT is insignificant.  In the net seller sample, FAMILYFIRM, FOUNDER, and 
DESCENDANT are negative with t-statistics ranging from -1.98 to -2.64, whereas HIRED 
is positive with a t-statistic equal to 1.99.  These results remain robust to controlling for 
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firm leverage, distress risk, firm age, the number of business segments, CEO tenure, CEO 
wealth, CEO compensation, the number of days from the transaction to one day before 
the SEC filing date, and the size of the trade scaled by the size of the firm.13   
Second, we perform two additional tests to ensure that our results are really driven 
by family firm status and are not simply a reflection of family firms’ concentrated 
ownership, which may exacerbate the conflict between large and minority shareholders.  
First, we include CEO ownership percentage in our CAR regressions, and the results 
(untabulated) are unaffected.  Second, we compare the CEO stock trading in family firms 
to that in non-family firms with a large presence of dedicated institutional investors – that 
is, we eliminate non-family firms in which the percentage of dedicated institutional 
investors is in the bottom quartile.  In this sample, founding members control 15.6% of 
their family firms, on average, and dedicated institutional investors control 15.4% of non-
family firms, on average.  We then re-estimate our portfolio and CAR models for this 
sample, but the results (untabulated) are unaffected.  These results suggest that the effect 
of family ownership on insider trading goes above and beyond a simple concentrated 
ownership effect. 
Third, Aboody and Lev (2000) document larger insider trading gains in R&D 
intensive firms.  We examine whether our results are driven by differences in R&D 
                                                 
13  We define leverage as long-term debt (Compustat#9) divided by total assets (Compustat#6).  We 
measure distress risk with the decile rank of Altman’s (1968) z-score.  Age is the number of years since the 
firm’s inception. If this information is unavailable, then we use the number of years the firm has been 
included in the CRSP database.  We obtain the number of segments from the Compustat Segment database.  
We use the market value of a CEO’s shareholding (the number of shares owned multiplied by the year-end 
stock price) to proxy for CEO wealth.  CEO compensation is proxied by the total amount of compensation 
reported in Execucomp (data item: TDC1).  The average number of days from the transaction to one day 
before the SEC filing date is 14.51 for family firms and 14.69 for non-family firms.  The scaled size of the 
trade is the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding at the end of the previous 
year.  The results also hold if we focus on trades of more than 10,000 shares (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee, 
2001).  Barclay and Warner (1993) find that the price impact is largest for medium-size trades (trades of 
more than 500 shares, but fewer than 10,000).  Focusing on large trades mitigates any liquidity issues. 
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intensity between family and non-family firms.  To do so, we re-estimate the portfolio 
regressions for non-R&D intensive firms alone.  We classify a firm as R&D intensive if 
its reported R&D expenses scaled by sales revenue are above the sample median; 
otherwise, we classify it as a non-R&D intensive firm.  The untabulated results indicate 
that, even in non-R&D intensive firms, the CEOs of family firms, founding CEOs in 
particular, earn excess returns from stock trading (α equals 2.2 percent with a t-statistic of 
2.24 for stock purchases; α equals -1.4 percent with a t-statistic of -1.99 for stock sales).  
Our conclusions with regard to founding and descendant CEOs are unaffected.  The 
intercepts in the hedge portfolios formed with descendant CEOs become insignificant 
(the t-statistic equals -1.43 for stock sales), but this may reflect the relatively low number 
of observations in this portfolio (n = 41).  These results suggest that our findings are not 
driven by any difference in R&D intensity between family and non-family firms. 
Fourth, results in Panel B of Table 1 indicate that family firms, particularly if they 
are managed by the founder, are smaller than non-family firms.  We control for this 
potentially confounding effect by including SMB in our portfolio-level regressions and by 
including the log of size in our firm level regression.  To further rule out the possibility 
that size has an effect through a non-linear relation with return, we perform two 
additional tests.  First, we replace the log of market capitalization in our firm level 
regression by nine size-decile-indicator variables.  Our results (untabulated) are similar.  
Second, we form a matched sample based on size, industry and profitability.  
Specifically, we match each family firm-year observation with a non-family firm in the 
same three-digit SIC industry and with the closest size (market value) and profitability 
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(ROA). We then use the matched sample to re-estimate our portfolio level regressions.  
Our results remain unaffected.  
Lastly, we consider the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on the 
profitability of trades.  Prior to the SOX, insiders had to report their trades no later than 
the 10th day of the calendar month following the date on which they were made.  Since its 
enactment in 2002, insiders must report trades within two business days.14  We repeat the 
estimation of equations (3a) and (3b) for the pre- and post-SOX period separately.  We 
find (in untabulated results) that the passage of the SOX does not eliminate our key 
results.  One exception is that the excess returns associated with the stock purchases by 
founding CEOs disappear in the post-SOX period if we consider the entire cross-section 
of family firms.  However, this relation still exists for family firms with high family 
ownership (i.e.; the same definition that is used in Panel B). 
 
Insider trading and transparency 
We now consider our second hypothesis, H2, which posits that the founding 
CEOs of family firms earn more abnormal returns than the CEOs of non-family firms 
only when the company is opaque and its value is uncertain.  To test this hypothesis, we 
use a model similar to (3b) and split the overall sample based on whether the firm’s value 
is difficult to ascertain or not.  We use three variables to proxy for such difficulty. 
First, we use a model of accounting quality derived from the Dechow and Ditchev 
(2002) approach.  Specifically, we calculate the measure using the procedure outlined in 
                                                 
14 Small acquisitions that do not exceed US$10,000 in market value within six months (SEC rule 16a-6) 
are exempt from these reporting requirements.  Such small acquisitions are not reported on Form 4, as 
insider transactions usually are, but on Form 5, which is due within 45 days of the issuer’s fiscal year end 
(SEC rule 16a-3(f)). 
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Ball and Shivakumar (2006).  We define ACCRUAL-QUALITY as an indicator variable 
that takes the value of one if the firm-specific accrual quality is above the median value, 
zero otherwise.  The correlation between ACCRUAL-QUALITY and FOUNDER within 
each sub-sample is insignificant (with p-values of 0.41 and 0.36, respectively), thus 
demonstrating that these two variables are not measuring the same underlying construct.  
We present the results in Panel A of Table 4,15 with the first two columns reporting those 
for transparent firms and the last two columns those for opaque firms.  FOUNDER is 
significant in the low-accrual-quality sample, with t-statistics equal to 2.41 and -1.94 in 
the purchase and sale regressions, respectively.  FOUNDER is insignificant, in contrast, 
in the high-accrual-quality firm sub-sample.  The untabulated results indicate that the 
coefficients associated with FOUNDER are significantly different from each other in the 
low- and high-transparency sub-samples.  These results support hypothesis H2.  
DESCENDANT is significantly negative only in the fourth column of Panel A in Table 4 
(net sellers in low-accrual-quality firms), with a t-statistic of -2.89, whereas HIRED is 
significant in the first two columns.   
Second, we follow Anderson et al. (2009) in developing an index 
(TRANSPARENCY) that employs four variables: AnalystFollowing, ForecastError, Bid-
ask Spread, and TradeVolume.  AnalystFollowing is the number of analysts providing 
earnings per share (EPS) estimates nine months prior to the fiscal year-end.  
ForecastError is the absolute value of the difference between the mean analysts’ earnings 
forecast (nine months prior to the end of the forecast) and actual firm earnings, scaled by 
the beginning of the year price.  Bid-ask Spread is the ask price minus the bid price 
                                                 
15  The correlation between ACCRUAL-QUALITY and FAMILY is also insignificant (0.41 and 0.26, 
respectively). 
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divided by the average of the bid and ask prices.  Bid-ask spreads are computed by 
averaging all trades for each firm from the third Wednesday of each month and then the 
average across these 12 observations.  TradeVolume is the firm’s average daily trading 
volume.  We rank our sample firms into 10 deciles based on AnalystFollowing, 
ForecastError, Bid-ask Spread, and TradeVolume, with the most transparent firms taking 
a value of 10 and the least transparent a value of 1.  The four ranks are then summed, and 
we split the overall sample using the median value of TRANSPARENCY.  The correlation 
between TRANSPARENCY and FOUNDER within each sub-sample is insignificant (with 
p-values of 0.21 and 0.33, respectively), thus demonstrating that these two variables are 
not measuring the same underlying construct.  We present the results in Panel B of Table 
4,16 with the first two columns reporting those for transparent firms and the last two 
columns those for opaque firms.  FOUNDER is significant in the opaque firm sub-sample, 
with t-statistics equal to 2.31 and -1.81 in the purchase and sale regressions, respectively.  
FOUNDER is insignificant, in contrast, in the transparent firm sub-sample.  The 
untabulated results indicate that the coefficients associated with FOUNDER are 
significantly different from each other in the low- and high-transparency sub-samples.  
These results support hypothesis H2.   
Lastly, we partition the firms into two groups: high-volatility and low-volatility 
firms.  It can be argued that more volatile firms are associated with a greater uncertainty 
of the firm and that the advantage is particularly strong when the company’s environment 
is unstable (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).  We follow Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and 
measure firm-specific volatility (VOLATILITY) as the standard deviation of the firm’s 
                                                 
16  The correlation between TRANSPARENCY and FAMILY is negative in the sub-sample of high-
transparency firms, but this relationship is only marginally significant (with a p-value of 0.09).  The 
correlation is totally insignificant in the sub-sample of low-transparency firms (with a p-value of 0.64). 
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monthly stock returns over the entire sample period.  We classify a company as highly 
volatile if its firm-specific volatility is above the median of the sample distribution; 
otherwise, we classify it as a low-volatility firm. 17  Untabulated results indicate that 
founding CEOs in the high-volatility sub-sample earn greater abnormal returns than the 
CEOs of non-family firms.  The t-statistics associated with FOUNDER are 2.18 and -2.56, 
respectively.  The magnitude of the coefficients is six to seven times smaller than in low-
volatility sub-sample than in the high-volatility sub-sample and the difference is 
statistically significant.  In addition, the t-statistics are only 0.35 and 0.31 in the sample of 
low volatility firms.  To the extent that there is a greater uncertainty about firm value 
when its price is volatile, these results support hypothesis H2.   
 
Insider trading and corporate governance 
We next test hypothesis H3 and examine whether the advantage that the founding 
CEOs of family firms have over the CEOs of non-family firms is mitigated when the 
firm’s corporate governance is good.  We do so by estimating model (3b) in a sample 
split into firms with a high and low degree of corporate governance.  We first 
operationalize the partition by considering the percentage of institutional ownership 
(INSTIT).  We classify firms as having a good corporate governance if their degree of 
institutional ownership is greater than the median level in the overall sample, and as 
having poor corporate governance otherwise.  The correlation between INSTIT and 
FOUNDER within each sub-group is insignificant (with p-values of 0.53 and 0.82, 
                                                 
17 The correlation between VOLATILITY and FOUNDER within each sub-group is totally insignificant 
(with p-values of 0.64 and 0.58, respectively), thus demonstrating that these two variables are not 
measuring the same underlying construct. The correlation between VOLATILITY and FAMILY within each 
sub-group is also insignificant (with p-values of 0.83 and 0.41, respectively). 
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respectively), thus demonstrating that these two variables are not measuring the same 
underlying construct.18  We present the results in Panel A of Table 5.  We find that 
FOUNDER is significant only in the low institutional ownership sub-sample (the t-
statistic is 1.98 in column (3), in which we consider net buyers, and -3.22 in the fourth 
column, in which we consider net sellers).  In contrast, both coefficients are insignificant 
in the high institutional ownership sub-sample.  The magnitude of the coefficients is three 
to eight times larger in the sub-sample of firms with a low degree of institutional 
ownership.  The untabulated results indicate that the coefficients associated with 
FOUNDER are significantly different from each other in the two sub-samples, which 
supports hypothesis H3a.  The coefficient on DESCENDANT is insignificant in all four 
columns of Table 5, whereas that on HIRED is significant only in the first two columns.   
Next, we investigate our last hypothesis, H3b, by re-estimating equation (3b), but 
with the sample split on the basis of whether the company has insider trading restrictions 
in place (a blackout trading period).  Following Roulstone (2003), we classify a firm as 
having insider trading restrictions if 75% of its insider trades occurred within 20 trading 
days of an earnings announcement.  The estimation results in Panel B of Table 5 indicate 
that FOUNDER is significant in the sub-sample of firms with no insider trading policy.  
The t-statistics are 1.83 and -3.13 in the third and fourth columns, respectively.  In 
contrast, FOUNDER is statistically insignificant in the sub-sample of firms that have 
enacted an insider trading policy (the t-statistics are -0.28 and -1.17, respectively).  The 
magnitude of the coefficients is two to four times larger in the sample of firms with a low 
degree of institutional ownership.  The untabulated results indicate that those associated 
                                                 
18 The correlation between INSTIT and FAMILY within each sub-group is also insignificant (with p-values 
of 0.41 and 0.83, respectively). 
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with FOUNDER are significantly different from each other in the sub-samples with a low 
and high probability of having a “blackout” policy.  These results are consistent with 
hypothesis H3b, which states that family CEOs are able to earn larger abnormal profits 
than the CEOs of non-family firms only in firms without insider-trading restrictions.  
As a robustness check, we also consider a partition based on a measure of overall 
corporate governance quality, the G-index (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003).  Accordingly, we 
split the overall sample based on the median value of the G-index (we lose approximately 
one third of our observations because this index is missing for many firms).  To conserve 
space, we do not tabulate these results, but they also indicate that founding CEOs earn 
more abnormal returns than the CEOs of non-family firms only in firms with a high G-
index.  More specifically, the t-statistics associated with FOUNDER are 2.02 and -2.37 
for insider purchases and insider sales, respectively, in the high G-index sub-sample, 
whereas they are insignificant in the low G-index sub-sample.  The coefficients are 
statistically different from each other at the 5% level.  
 
Correlation between the different partitions  
Our results thus far indicate that founding CEOs earn superior returns only in 
firms characterized low levels of transparency, institutional ownership and governance 
rating, by a high degree of price volatility, and by no insider trading restrictions. It would 
be natural to wonder, however, whether the partitioned samples are independent of one 
another or essentially include the same firms. To examine this issue, we calculate the 
pair-wise correlations between our partitioning variables. The untabulated results indicate 
a low level of correlation, with the two largest existing between accrual quality and 
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transparency (the coefficient equals 0.31 and is significant at the 5% level) and between 
volatility and transparency (the coefficient equals 0.13 and is significant at the 1% level).  
The other pair-wise correlations are all below 0.10 and are mostly insignificant.  We thus 
conclude that, except for our measures of transparency, the partitioning variables are 
largely independent of one another. 
 
Likelihood of instituting a “blackout” policy 
Our results indicate that founding CEOs are able to earn greater abnormal returns 
than their counter-parts in non-family firms when the firm they manage is either opaque 
or have a poor governance.  It would be natural to wonder if family CEOs manage 
opacity and governance strategically to gain this advantage.  To answer this question, we 
perform two tests. First, we examine whether the likelihood of a firm instituting a 
“blackout” policy is lower when family CEOs are involved. Specifically, we employ a 
Probit model to regress RESTRICT on FOUNDER, DESCENDANT, and HIRED, 
controlling for TRANSPARENT, VOLALITY, SIZE, MB, ROA, INS_TRADE (the ratio of 
total insider trading over the sample period to total shares outstanding), and year and 
industry indicators (Roulstone, 2003).  We correct the z-statistics for heteroskedasticity 
and for the simultaneous clustering of observations by firm and calendar year.  The 
untabulated results indicate that the coefficient associated with FOUNDER is extremely 
negatively significant with a t-statistic of -18.00 (marginal probability equals 10%).  In 
contrast, HIRED is positive with a t-statistic of 3.46 (marginal probability equals 4%).  
DESCENDANT and the different control variables are statistically insignificant (except 
for MB and ROA, which are both marginally positive).  This result confirms that founding 
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CEOs face fewer, whereas hired CEOs of family firms face more insider trading 
restrictions as compared to CEOs of non-family firms.  Second, Anderson et al. (2009) 
indicate that founder and descendant firms are more opaque than non-family firms.  We 
confirm their results in our sample by repeating the test described above but substituting 
ACCRUAL-QUALITY to RESTRICT.  We find that family firms are related to lower 
accrual quality.  When we consider the different types of family CEOs, we find that the 
negative effect is only significant for founding and descendant CEOs.  The coefficient is 
positive but insignificant for HIRED.  These results are consistent with the idea that 
founding CEOs manage opacity and governance strategically to gain a trading advantage. 
 
Insider trading conditional on future performance  
 Finally, we examine more precisely where the source of the superior returns 
earned by founding CEOs lies.  More specifically, we conduct two additional tests to 
determine whether these abnormal returns are caused by a short- or long-term advantage.  
First, we consider the profitability of trades made in three different time periods: the 10 
days prior to an earnings announcement that creates a surprise, the 10 days prior to an 
earnings announcement that does not create a surprise, and all days outside the pre-
earnings announcement period.  We consider a firm’s quarterly earnings announcement 
to create a surprise if the difference between actual quarterly earnings and the consensus 
earnings forecasts is in the first and fifth quintile of the distribution for the entire sample.  
We tabulate the differences between the mean CARs for different types of family firm 
and non-family firm CEOs in Panel A of Table 6.  We also report the t-statistics for the 
differences in CARs between the three different types of family and non-family firms.  
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As can be seen from this panel, greater profitability is witnessed for both purchases and 
sales made by founding CEOs prior to an earnings surprise (compared to similar trades 
made by the CEOs of non-family firms), but not for those made by descendant and hired 
CEOs.  In contrast, we observe significant differences in profitability for trades made 
outside pre-earnings announcement periods for all three groups of family CEOs.  
Consistent with our prior results, trades made by founding CEOs (and, to a lesser extent, 
by descendant CEOs) are more profitable than those made by the CEOs of non-family 
firms, whereas those made by the hired CEOs of family firms are less profitable than 
those made by their counterparts in non-family firms.  Not surprisingly, we observe no 
significant patterns before an earnings announcement that does not create a surprise.   
Second, we investigate whether the differences in abnormal returns experienced 
by family CEOs are due to private information about the future of the firm.  More 
specifically, we examine whether stock trades by the CEOs of family firms are more 
associated with the company’s future stock returns.  To do so, we compute the percentage 
of CEOs who are net buyers (net sellers), conditional on the 12-month market-adjusted 
return being positive (negative) for family and non-family firms, respectively, and then 
report the differences in this percentage (and the corresponding t-statistics) in Panel B of 
Table 6.  The results indicate that the trading behavior of founding and descendant CEOs 
is a better indicator of future firm profitability than that of non-family firm CEOs.  In 
contrast, we observe no significant difference for the hired CEOs of family firms.  The 
results hold true for both sales and purchases (except for descendant CEOs, in which case 
the difference is significant only for net sellers).19  Overall, these findings suggest that 
                                                 
19 As a robustness check, we evaluate a model similar to that in Piotroski and Roulstone (2005), and the 
results are broadly consistent with those reported in Panel B of Table 6.  We find no evidence of greater 
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founding CEOs have more opportunities to accrue benefits through trading in their firm’s 
stocks during blackout periods, and also earn excess trading returns based on their 
superior business knowledge.  
 
V. Conclusion 
We examine how insider trading differs between family and non-family firms.  
Our results are generally consistent with the idea that family members can use their 
position for their own benefits at the expense of uninformed external shareholders.  First, 
the CEOs of family firms, founding CEOs in particular, are more active stock traders than 
their counterparts in non-family firms.  More importantly, the trades of family firm CEOs 
are more profitable than those of their non-family firm counterparts.  We find this to hold 
particularly true for founding CEOs.  In contrast, the profitability of the sales made by the 
hired CEOs of family firms is less than that of those made by their counterparts in non-
family firms.  Additional results suggest that our findings do not merely reflect the effect 
of concentrated ownership or size, but rather demonstrate that family businesses are 
different from other types of firms. 
Second, certain firm characteristics affect the differences found in insider trading 
between family and non-family firms.  Specifically, larger insider trading gains for 
founding CEOs occur only in family firms that are difficult to value, either because they 
have low-accrual-quality, they operate in an opaque environment or they are 
characterized by a high degree of price volatility.  We also find that larger insider trading 
gains for founding CEOs occur only in family firms with poor corporate governance, as 
                                                                                                                                                 
contrarian activity for family firm managers than for non-family firm CEOs, but we do confirm that the 
trades made by founding CEOs are indicators of future abnormal performance. 
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proxied by a low degree of institutional ownership, the absence of a “blackout” period 
policy, or a low G-index score.  Further, the likelihood of a firm instituting such a 
“blackout” period policy is lower if it is a family firm with a founding or descendant 
CEO than if it is a non-family firm but greater if it is a family firm with a hired CEO.   
Third, we consider whether the advantage over the CEOs of non-family firms 
enjoyed by the CEOs of family firms is a short- or medium- to long-run effect.  We find 
support for both views.  More specifically, founding CEOs who trade before an earnings 
surprise earn higher abnormal returns than the CEOs of non-family firms who engage in 
similar trades, but the trades made by founding CEOs outside an earnings announcement 
period also forecast year-ahead abnormal returns better than similar trades made by CEOs 
of non family firms. 
We motivated our analysis by the hypothesis that the CEOs of family firms, the 
founding CEOs in particular, may have better information about their firms or greater 
capacity to use that information than their counterparts in non-family firms.  Overall, our 
results provide support for both explanations.  Our findings that family CEOs earn more 
abnormal returns than the CEOs of non-family firms only in the sub-samples of firms 
with weaker governance, or when they trade prior to an earnings surprise, and that hired 
CEOs of family firms earn fewer abnormal returns than their counterparts in non-family 
firms, all support the notion that founding family members strategically choose their 
firms’ corporate governance to serve their own purposes. 20  In contrast, our findings that 
founding CEOs earn superior abnormal returns only in firms that are difficult to value 
and that their trades made outside earnings announcement periods better forecast 12-
                                                 
20 If our results were driven only by a difference in information advantage, then we would expect the hired 
CEOs of family firms to behave no differently from the hired CEOs of non-family firms. 
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month-ahead abnormal returns are consistent with the notion that founding CEOs have 
greater understanding of their firms than do typical managers. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for firm attributes.  The sample includes S&P 1500 firms from the years 1997 to 2006.  Panel A presents the means, median 
tests, and standard deviations for S&P 1500 family and non-family firm attributes.  Panel B presents the mean (median) firm attributes for S&P 
1500 family firms with founding CEOs, descendant CEOs, and hired CEOs, and those for non-family firms.  Founding CEO family firms are firms 
in which the founder is the CEO.  Descendant CEO family firms are firms in which one of the founder’s heirs is the CEO.  Hired CEO family 
firms are firms in which the CEO has been hired from outside the family.  Freq measures how many times a CEO trades his or her stocks during 
the year (including open market purchases and sales).  MeanShares measures the number of shares traded per stock transaction during the year (in 
millions).  MeanShares% measures total shares traded per year as a percentage of total shares owned by CEO at the beginning of the year. 
MeanValue measures the monetary value per stock transaction during the year (in US$ millions).  CAR is the cumulative abnormal returns from 
the transaction date to one day before its filing date with the SEC.  We use the traditional market model to compute abnormal stock returns.  CEO 
ownership (%) is the percentage of shares owned by the CEO relative to the firm’s total shares outstanding.  SIZE is the natural logarithm of the 
market value (in US$ millions) of common equity (Compustat Data#25*Data#199) at the end of the fiscal year.  MB is the ratio of the market 
value of common equity (Compustat Data#25*Data#199) to the book value of common equity (Compustat Data#60) at the end of the fiscal year.  
ROA is the accounting return (Compustat Data#18) on total assets (Compustat Data#6).   
 
Panel A: Summary statistics and difference of means and median tests for S&P 1500 family and non-family firms 
 
 Means Median Standard Deviation 
 Family firm Non-family firm Family firm 
Non-family 
firm 
Family firm Non-family 
firm 
Freq           10.927 7.263 2.962 2.095 31.139 18.176 
MeanShares 
(million) 0.066 0.035 0.020 0.016 0.146 0.076 
MeanShares% 4.512 2.617 0.834 0.602 3.865 2.597 
MeanValue 
($million) 2.134 1.379 0.645 0.500 4.651 3.107 
CAR_Purchase 0.050 0.046 0.036 0.039 0.154 0.139 
CAR_Sale          -0.023          -0.024          -0.020          -0.018 0.146 0.131 
CEO ownership (%) 3.364 0.612 0.783 0.115 7.376 2.617 
SIZE 7.207 7.664 7.059 7.553 1.536 1.681 
MB 3.482 3.243 2.455 2.273 3.342 3.248 
ROA 0.050 0.044 0.051 0.041 0.082 0.080 
N 6,039 7,541 6,039 7,541 6,039 7,541 
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Panel B: Summary statistics and difference of means and median tests for S&P 1500 family and non-family firms 
 
 Mean Median 
 Founding 
CEO 
Descendant 
CEO Hired CEO 
Non-Family 
firms 
Founding 
CEO 
Descendant 
CEO Hired CEO 
Non-Family 
firms 
Freq  12.468      (3.37)*** 
     12.768 
      (2.62)*** 
    7.293 
   (0.02) 
7.263        3.900 
      (4.79)*** 
     2.613 
    (0.89) 
     2.183 
    (0.66) 
2.095 
MeanShares 
(million) 
      0.087*** 
     (6.98) 
      0.048* 
     (1.71) 
    0.052** 
   (2.59) 
      0.035   0.028*** 
      (6.86) 
 0.018 
    (1.42) 
     0.018 
    (1.31) 
0.016 
MeanShares%      5.821***      (4.54) 
     4.846*** 
     (3.17) 
3.189* 
   (1.92) 
2.617   0.924*** 
 (4.09) 
0.753** 
   (2.47) 
0.617 
    (0.82) 
0.602 
MeanValue 
($million) 
  2.592*** 
 (4.71) 
  1.513 
     (0.42) 
    1.790 
   (1.73) 
      1.379   0.829*** 
     (5.13) 
 0.530 
    (0.31) 
     0.565 
    (1.27) 
0.500 
CAR_ Purchase 
0.073 
   (4.06)*** 
      0.054 
     (0.48) 
     0.020 
  (-5.35)*** 
0.046        0.065 
      (3.51)*** 
      0.037 
    (-0.42) 
     0.015 
   (-5.02)*** 
0.039 
CAR_ Sale 
     -0.029 
 (-1.98)** 
     -0.026 
    (-1.96)** 
   -0.014 
   (3.00)*** 
     -0.024       -0.027 
     (-2.16)** 
     -0.021 
   (-1.69)* 
   -0.012 
   (2.86)*** 
    -0.018 
%CEO ownership 6.049   (45.37)*** 
3.069 
  (23.34)*** 
     0.758 
  (2.89)*** 
0.612        1.493 
 (37.57)*** 
0.677 
  (22.04)*** 
    0.151 
 (4.85)*** 
0.115 
SIZE 6.986  (-18.50)*** 
7.170 
  (-8.75)*** 
     7.478 
(-4.76)*** 
7.664        6.868 
 (-18.03)*** 
7.082 
   (-8.58)*** 
    7.263 
 (-5.20)*** 
7.553 
MB 3.752    (6.80)*** 
2.531 
   (6.58)*** 
     3.553 
 (4.01)*** 
3.243 2.545 
   (6.50)*** 
2.017 
  (-6.84)*** 
    2.603 
 (7.25)*** 
2.273 
ROA 0.050    (3.22)*** 
0.048 
(1.75)* 
     0.052 
 (4.60)*** 
0.044 0.050 
   (5.90)*** 
0.048 
    (3.11)*** 
    0.054 
 (7.97)*** 
0.041 
N   2,728     967     2,344 7,541    2,728     967    2,344 7,541 
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Table 2 
Family firms and insider trading frequency and size.  Panel A reports the regression estimates for 
the association between family firm status and the frequency of CEO stock trading and the size of 
his or her stock transactions.  For transaction size, we consider the natural log of average shares 
per transaction and the natural log of monetary value per transaction.  In Panel B, we repeat the 
same estimation but use three indicator variables: FOUNDER, DESCENDANT, and HIRED.  
FAMILYFIRM equals one if the company is a family firm, and zero otherwise.  FOUNDER 
equals one if the family firm’s CEO is its founder, and zero otherwise.  DESCENDANT equals 
one if the family firm’s CEO is the descendant of its founder, and zero otherwise.  HIRED equals 
one if the family firm’s CEO is not related to the firm’s founding family, and zero otherwise.  
Freq measures how many times a CEO trade his or her stocks during the year (including open 
market purchases and sales).  MeanValue measures the monetary value per stock transaction 
during the year (in US$ millions).  MeanShares% measures total shares traded per year as a 
percentage of total shares owned by CEO at the beginning of the year.  SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of the market value (in US$ millions) of common equity (Compustat 
Data#25*Data#199) at the end of the fiscal year.  MB is the ratio of the market value of common 
equity (Compustat Data#25*Data#199) to the book value of common equity (Compustat Data#60) 
at the end of the fiscal year.  ROA is the accounting return (Compustat Data#18) on total assets 
(Compustat Data#6).  We include industry and year indicator variables in the regression, and use 
two-digit SIC codes for industry membership.  The t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and for the clustering of observations by firm and calendar month.  The t-statistics are in 
parentheses, and *** indicates significance at the 0.01 level, ** indicates significance at the 0.05 
level, and * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
Panel A: Regression estimates  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Freq MeanValue MeanShares% 
Intercept          -1.920 4.217 0.051 
         (-0.83)   (-8.98)***     (3.78)*** 
FAMILY           3.506 0.365 0.017 
    (3.49)***    (7.97)***           (2.89)*** 
SIZE           0.689 0.309           -0.004 
   (2.53)**    (4.27)***          (-2.22)** 
MB           0.640 0.115 0.001 
   (4.17)***     (7.27)***           (0.36) 
ROA          3.572 3.505 0.051 
   (5.85)***     (3.58)***           (1.83)* 
Industry indicator variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year indicator variables Yes Yes Yes 
N         13,580 13580            13580 
Adjusted R2          0.022 0.101 0.017 
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Panel B: Regression estimates  
 
 
 
 
 Freq MeanValue MeanShares% 
Intercept         -2.747        -4.294         0.050 
        (-1.18)  (-9.82)***   (3.62)*** 
FOUNDER          6.702         0.674         0.026 
   (5.15)***  (11.74)***        (3.58)*** 
DESCENDANT          5.040         0.256         0.018 
   (2.56)***   (2.73)***        (1.82)* 
HIRED        -0.625         0.043         0.002 
       (-0.46)        (0.71)        (0.43) 
SIZE          0.792         0.320        -0.004 
   (2.90)***   (5.15)*** (-2.22)** 
MB          0.639         0.112          0.001 
   (4.15)***   (6.88)***         (0.29) 
ROA          3.010         3.577 0.050 
   (5.92)***   (2.92)*** (1.72)* 
Industry indicator variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year indicator variables Yes Yes Yes 
N        13,580          13580          13580 
Adjusted R2         0.027           0.110           0.021 
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Table 3 
Family firms and insider trading profitability.  This table presents the portfolio returns from going 
long on a CEO’s stock trading in family firms and going short on such trading in non-family 
firms.  The portfolio returns are computed as follows.  For each individual firm, we calculate the 
mean raw returns from the stock transaction date to one day prior to the SEC filing date for all of 
the CEO’s stock transactions during the month.  We then calculate the mean returns separately 
for four portfolios: family firms whose CEO is a net stock purchaser, family firms whose CEO is 
a net stock seller, non-family firms whose CEO is a net stock purchaser, and non-family firms 
whose CEO is a net stock seller.  RMt is the return on the value-weighted market index at time t.  
RFt is the three-month T bill yield at time t.  SMBt is the return on small firms minus the return on 
large firms at time t.  HMLt is the return on high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low 
book-to-market stocks at time t.  MOMt is the momentum factor in Carhart (1997).  In Panel B, 
we repeat the same procedure, but separate family firms into high and low family ownership 
groups.  A family firm is considered to have a high degree of family ownership if the ownership 
stake held by the founding family is above the sample median; the remaining family firms are 
considered to have a low degree of family ownership.  The t-statistics are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and for serial correlation using the Newey-West procedure.  *** indicates 
significance at the 0.01 level, ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level, and * indicates 
significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
Panel A: Portfolio returns from going long on a CEO’s stock trading in family firms and going 
short on such trading in non-family firms 
 Dep. Var = Hedge portfolio monthly returns from going long on family 
firms and short on non-family firms 
 Insider purchases 
 Family firm Founding CEO Descendant CEO Hired CEO 
Intercept 0.024   (2.38)** 
0.031 
  (2.29)** 
-0.004 
          (-0.21) 
0.007 
(1.19) 
RMt - RFt 
-0.138 
         (-0.65) 
-0.481 
       (-1.43) 
0.493 
          (0.93) 
-0.511 
(-2.34)** 
SMBt 
-0.197 
         (-0.67) 
0.012 
        (0.06) 
-0.422 
(-1.28) 
-0.399 
(-1.67)* 
HMLt 
-0.311 
         (-1.04) 
-0.039 
(-0.75) 
-0.582 
(-0.91) 
-0.581 
(-2.38)** 
MOMt  
-0.174 
         (-0.54) 
-0.113 
        (-0.42) 
-0.238 
(-0.54) 
-0.185 
(-1.29) 
N 120 108 51 112 
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.016 0.039 0.070 
 Insider sales  
 Family firm Founding CEO Descendant CEO Hired CEO 
Intercept -0.012 (-1.84)* 
-0.015 
  (-2.16)** 
-0.015 
  (-2.22)** 
0.012 
  (2.24)** 
RMt - RFt 
0.163 
 (2.38)** 
0.274 
(1.54) 
0.250 
(1.18) 
0.008 
(0.02) 
SMBt 
-0.115 
(-0.84) 
0.066 
(0.36) 
0.305 
(1.38) 
-0.216 
(-1.51) 
HMLt 
-0.079 
(-0.21) 
-0.216 
(-0.96) 
0.137 
(0.47) 
-0.345 
(-1.84)* 
MOMt  
0.104 
(1.25) 
-0.250 
  (-2.08)** 
0.350 
  (2.41)** 
0.257 
   (1.74)* 
N 120 105 118 120 
Adjusted R2 0.041 0.024 0.053 0.065 
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Panel B: Portfolio returns from going long on a CEO’s stock trading in (1) family firms with a 
high degree of family ownership and short on such trading in non-family firms vs. (2) going long 
on family firms with a low degree of family ownership and short on stock trading in non-family 
firms 
 
 Stock trading by CEOs of family firms with a high degree of 
family ownership vs. CEO stock trading in non-family firms 
 Family firm Founding CEO Descendant CEO Hired CEO 
Insider 
purchases 
0.035 
          (2.64) ** 
N=112 
0.042 
        (2.08)** 
N=100 
0.003 
           (0.63) 
N=32 
0.006 
       (0.82) 
N=84 
Insider sales 
-0.021 
  (-2.37)** 
N=120 
-0.025 
     (-2.79)*** 
N=105 
-0.024 
     (-2.88)*** 
N=112 
0.019     
(2.34)** 
N=116 
 Stock trading by CEOs of family firms with a low degree of family ownership vs. CEO stock trading in non-family firms 
Insider 
purchases 
0.009 
          (0.48) 
N=108 
0.019 
(1.83)* 
N=82 
-0.009 
(-0.85) 
N=27 
0.008 
(1.07) 
N=96 
Insider sales 
-0.003 
(-0.41) 
N=120 
-0.006 
(-0.21) 
N=105 
-0.007 
 (-0.62) 
N=92 
0.005 
(0.41) 
N=117 
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Table 4 
The impact of corporate transparency on insider trading in family firms.  Our sample firms are 
classified into two groups based on the difficulty of valuing them.  In Panel A, we consider firm-
specific accrual quality as a partitioning variable.  We define accrual quality as in Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006). A company is considered to have high accrual quality if its measure of 
quality is above the median of the sample distribution; otherwise, it is classified as a low-accrual-
quality firm.  In Panel B, we use a transparency index similar to that in Anderson et al. (2009) to 
operationalize transparency.  A company is considered to be transparent if its transparency value 
is above the median of the sample distribution; otherwise, it is classified as opaque.  The 
dependent variable, CAR, is the cumulative abnormal returns from the transaction date to one day 
before its SEC filing date.  We use the traditional market model to compute abnormal stock 
returns.  FOUNDER is an indicator variable equal to one if the company is a family firm whose 
CEO is the founder, and zero otherwise.  DESCENDANT is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the company is a family firm whose CEO is a descendant of the firm’s founder, and zero 
otherwise.  HIRED is an indicator variable equal to one if the company is a family firm whose 
CEO has been hired from outside the family, and zero otherwise.  SIZE is the natural log of the 
firm’s total assets.  MB is the firm-specific market-to-book ratio.  ROA is earnings before 
extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets.  SIZE, MB, and ROA are included in Panel B, 
but are not tabulated.  We also include, but do not tabulate, industry and year indicator variables.  
The t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and for the clustering of observations by firm 
and calendar month. *** indicates significance at the 0.01 level, ** indicates significance at the 
0.05 level, and * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
Panel A: The effect of accrual quality on insider trading profitability 
 
 High accrual quality firms Low accrual quality firms 
 (1) 
Insider purchases
(2) 
Insider sales 
(3) 
Insider purchases 
(4) 
Insider sales 
Intercept 0.016 -0.034 0.039 -0.055 
     (3.81)***     (-2.93)***    (4.17)***    (-3.03)** 
FOUNDER 0.008 -0.016 0.021 -0.023 
 (0.38) (-1.28)   (2.41)** (-1.94)* 
DESCENDANT 0.006 0.08           -0.006 -0.033 
 (0.41) (0.69)          (-0.18)    (-2.89)*** 
HIRED -0.027 0.011           -0.013 0.036 
  (-1.83)*    (2.77)***          (-1.05)  (0.79) 
SIZE -0.016 0.007 -0.019 0.011 
     (-4.21)***     (2.88)***   (-2.23)** (0.85) 
MB -0.003 0.002 -0.004 0.008 
 (-0.25) (2.31) (-0.26)   (2.07)** 
ROA -0.089 -0.053 -0.124 0.073 
 (-0.42) (-0.31)     (-2.96)*** (0.92) 
Industry indicator 
variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year indicator 
variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.037 0.040 0.028 
N 1,468 5,724 1659 5,906 
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Panel B: The effect of corporate transparency on insider trading profitability 
 
 
 
 
 Transparent firms Opaque firms 
 (1) 
Insider purchases
(2) 
Insider sales 
(3) 
Insider purchases 
(4) 
Insider sales 
Intercept 0.017 -0.084 0.036 -0.058 
     (4.57)***     (-4.13)***    (3.35)***    (-2.59)** 
FOUNDER 0.010 -0.010 0.042 -0.016 
 (0.53) (-1.37)   (2.31)** (-1.81)* 
DESCENDANT 0.002 0.017 0.015 -0.033 
 (0.56) (1.47) (0.72)    (-2.89)*** 
HIRED -0.033 0.019 -0.022 0.025 
     (-2.71)***   (2.24)**  (-1.31)  (0.35) 
SIZE -0.014 0.007 -0.013 0.004 
     (-3.48)***     (2.88)*** (-1.93)* (1.41) 
MB -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.004 
 (-0.67) (2.31) (-0.57)   (2.52)** 
ROA -0.121 -0.023 -0.174 0.061 
 (-0.83) (-0.23)     (-3.48)*** (1.13) 
Industry indicator 
variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year indicator 
variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.048 0.019 0.028 
N 1083 4911 1023 4920 
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Table 5 
The impact of corporate governance on insider trading profitability in family firms.  Our sample 
firms are classified into two groups based on the quality of their corporate governance.  In Panel 
A, we consider the effect of institutional ownership.  If a firm’s level of institutional ownership is 
higher than the sample median, then it is considered to have a high level of institutional 
ownership; otherwise, it is considered to have a low such level.  In Panel B, we consider the 
effect of insider trading restrictions.  A firm is considered to have insider trading restrictions in 
place if 75% of its insider trades occurred within the 20 trading days following a quarterly 
earnings announcement.  The dependent variable, CAR, is the cumulative abnormal returns from 
the transaction date to one day before its SEC filing date.  We use the traditional market model to 
compute abnormal stock returns.  FOUNDER is an indicator variable equal to one if the company 
is a family firm whose CEO is the founder, and zero otherwise.  DESCENDANT is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the company is a family firm whose CEO is a descendant of the firm 
founder, and zero otherwise.  HIRED is an indicator variable equal to one if the company is a 
family firm whose CEO has been hired from outside the family, and zero otherwise.  SIZE is the 
natural log of the firm’s total assets.  MB is the firm-specific market-to-book ratio.  ROA is 
earnings before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets.  SIZE, MB, and ROA are 
included, but are not tabulated.  We also include, but do not tabulate, industry and year indicator 
variables.  The t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and for the clustering of 
observations by firm and calendar month. *** indicates significance at the 0.01 level, ** indicates 
significance at the 0.05 level, and * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
Panel A: The likelihood of firm-level insider trading restrictions   
 Firms with high level of 
institutional ownership 
Firms with low level of 
institutional ownership 
 (1) 
Insider purchases 
(2) 
Insider sales 
(3) 
Insider purchases 
(4) 
Insider sales 
Intercept 0.087 0.012 0.088 -0.058 
     (3.41)*** (0.67)    (2.61)**     (-2.67)*** 
FOUNDER -0.012 -0.004 0.041 -0.036 
 (-0.43) (-0.54)   (1.98)**    (-3.22)*** 
DESCENDANT 0.032 -0.007 0.020 -0.010 
 (1.36) (-1.06) (0.75)  (-1.43) 
HIRED -0.041 0.020 -0.013 -0.007 
     (-3.81)***     (2.67)***  (-0.76)  (-0.23) 
SIZE -0.009 -0.005 -0.008 0.004 
 (-1.53)   (-2.37)** (-1.78)* (1.91)* 
MB -0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 (-1.53)     (2.78)*** (1.25)  (1.80)* 
ROA -0.351 -0.151 -0.114 0.024 
 (-1.95)*  (-2.54)**  (-0.90) (0.36) 
Industry 
indicator 
variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year indicator 
variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.079 0.024 0.035 0.032 
N 1298 6208 2101 6790 
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Panel B: The effect of insider trading restrictions on insider trading gains   
 
 
 Firms with insider trading 
restrictions 
Firms without insider trading 
restrictions 
 (1) 
Insider purchases
(2) 
Insider sales 
(3) 
Insider purchases 
(4) 
Insider sales 
Intercept 0.124 -0.032 0.084 -0.061 
     (3.73)*** (-1.06)    (2.29)**     (-3.89)*** 
FOUNDER -0.010 -0.013 0.044 -0.026 
 (-0.28) (-1.17) (1.83)*    (-3.13)*** 
DESCENDANT 0.014 0.006 -0.003 -0.022 
 (0.35) (0.54) (-0.13)  (-1.83)* 
HIRED -0.053 0.008 -0.037 0.001 
     (-2.97)*** (0.61)    (-2.16)**  (0.14) 
SIZE -0.013 0.001 -0.008 0.004 
 (-1.58) (0.09) (-1.44)  (2.34)** 
MB -0.001 0.001 0.014 0.003 
 (-0.15)  (0.93) (1.84)*   (2.81)*** 
ROA -0.388 -0.004 -0.089 0.027 
     (-2.97)*** (-1.06)  (-0.47) (0.19) 
Industry 
indicator 
variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year indicator 
variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.110 0.009 0.061 0.029 
N 1355 5436 1521 5794 
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Table 6 
Sources of the excess returns family CEOs earn from insider trading.  Panel A reports the excess 
profitability earned by the CEOs of family firms from insider trading.  We separate the CEO’s 
stock trades into three types: (1) stock trading that occurs 10 days before quarterly earnings 
announcements that contain earnings surprises; (2) stock trading that occurs 10 days before 
quarterly earnings announcements that do not contain earnings surprises; and (3) stock trading 
that does not occur before quarterly earnings announcements.  We consider a firm’s quarterly 
earnings announcement to have an earnings surprise if the difference between its actual quarterly 
earnings and the consensus earnings forecasts is ranked in the first and fifth quintile of the entire 
sample.  The number in each cell represents the excess trading profitability earned by the CEOs 
of family firms relative to their counterparts in non-family firms.  We use the cumulative 
abnormal returns from the transaction date to one day before the SEC filing date (CAR) as a 
proxy for stock trading profitability.  The traditional market model is used to compute abnormal 
stock returns.  FOUNDER is an indicator variable that equals one if the family firm’s CEO is its 
founder, and zero otherwise.  DESCENDANT is an indicator variable that equals one if the family 
firm’s CEO is a descendant of its founder, and zero otherwise.  HIRED is an indicator variable 
that equals one if the family firm’s CEO is not related to the founding family, and zero otherwise.  
Panel B reports the additional likelihood of family firm CEOs being net purchasers (net sellers) 
conditional on future positive (negative) stock performance.  More specifically, we first compute 
the percentage of CEOs who are net purchasers (sellers) conditional on future good (bad) news 
for those of family and non-family firms, respectively.  Next, we report the differences in the 
percentage across family and non-family firms and test its significance.  MARETt+1 is future 12-
month market-adjusted returns, measured as the firm’s 12-month cumulative returns during fiscal 
year t+1 less the corresponding 12-month return on the value-weighted market index.  The t-
statistics are for the differences between the corresponding cell and non-family firms. *** 
indicates significance at the 0.01 level, ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level, and * indicates 
significance at the 0.10 level. 
 
Panel A: Family firms and insider trading profitability  
 
 Insider trades that occur 10 trading days before quarterly  earnings 
announcements with an earnings surprise 
 (1) 
Founding CEO 
(2) 
Descendant CEO 
(3) 
Hired CEO 
Insider 
purchases 
    0.051* 
(1.86) 
-0.016 
(-0.10) 
-0.023 
(0.28) 
Insider sales      -0.039** (-2.04) 
0.015 
(0.43) 
0.016 
(1.22) 
 Insider trades that occur 10 trading days before quarterly earnings announcements without an earnings surprise 
Insider 
purchases 
-0.044 
(-1.12) 
-0.019 
(0.25) 
-0.071 
(-1.24) 
Insider sales -0.015 (-0.99) 
-0.023 
(-0.23) 
0.010 
(0.62) 
 Insider trades that do not occur 10 trading days before quarterly  earnings announcements 
Insider 
purchases 
   0.046* 
(1.92) 
-0.053 
(-0.66) 
         -0.035*** 
 (-4.02) 
Insider sales   -0.016** (-2.04) 
  -0.044** 
(-1.99) 
     0.030** 
(1.99) 
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Panel B: Additional likelihood of the CEO of a family firm engaging in purchases/sales 
conditional on future stock performance  
 
 Good news (MARETt+1 > 0) 
 Founding CEO Descendant CEO Hired CEO 
Additional 
percentage of net 
buyers  
0.108** 
(1.97) 
-0.042 
(-1.35) 
0.073 
(0.05) 
 Bad news (MARETt+1 < 0) 
 Founding CEO Descendant CEO Hired CEO 
Additional 
percentage of net 
sellers 
0.070** 
(2.24) 
0.058** 
(2.11) 
-0.040 
(-1.10) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
